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BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT: FREE ACCESS
TO CIVIL COURTS FOR INDIGENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 1, 1968 the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, established amid urban turmoil the previous summer,1
issued its final report.2 After extensive investigation into the
causes of the rioting, the Commission concluded that the disorders
were a direct result of the "frustrations of powerlessness. '3 The
volatile condition was generated by the existence of "no effective
alternative to violence as a means of achieving redress of griev-
ances, and of moving the system.' 4 This alienation and hostility
toward the institutions of law and government could only be elimi-
nated by "increasing the capacity of our public and private institu-
tions to respond to these problems." 5
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court in Boddie
v. Connecticut6 rendered a decision increasing the capacity of the
legal system to afford redress of grievances to a socio-economic
class which was without access to the judicial process due to in-
digency. The Court held that the operation of Connecticut stat-
utes,7 which prevented the petitioners from dissolving their mar-
riages because of inability to pay filing and service costs, was in-
valid under the due process clause or the fourteenth amendment.9
Although all but one of the justices agreed that access to the judi-
cial process must be afforded in this civil action as a matter of
right, the constitutional question elicited four separate and equally
adamant opinions.10 This Note will analyze and review the de-
1. Exec. Order No. 11,365, 3 C.F.R. 674 (1967).
2. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 11.
6. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
7. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-259-61 (Supp. 1971).
8. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
9. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10. 401 U.S. at 372-83 (Mr. Justice Harlan writing for the majority);
401 U.S. at 383-86 (Mr. Justice Douglas concurring); 401 U.S. at 386-89
velopment of the case law leading to Boddie, as well as recent
cases involving similar appeals by indigents for free access to the
civil courts.
II. CHALLENGES TO DELIMIT AcCESS TO THE COURTS PRIOR TO BODDIE
The basic controversy in Boddie was whether the state of
Connecticut could limit access to the civil courts for a divorce by
requiring a filing and service of process fee "from Gladys Boddie
and persons similarly situated."'" Although the issue of access
presented in Boddie was one of first impression, similar cases con-
cerning the limitation of the right to be heard have been before the
courts. From these antecedent cases involving other access ques-
tions, the justices fashioned their several opinions in Boddie. An
understanding of these civil and criminal access cases is a prerequi-
site to a proper comprehension and evaluation of the Boddie de-
cision.
A. Access to the Courts in Criminal Proceedings
Initial entry into the judicial process has never been a problem
in criminal cases. The government never constructed any barriers,
financial or otherwise, to keep the prosecution or defense out of
court.1 2 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
insures the criminally accused the opportunity to present his de-
fense in court.13 The difficulty concerning access in criminal cases
arose when the state granted a statutory right to appeal convic-
tions. The question confronting the courts was whether a criminal
defendant could be denied an appeal because of his inability to pay
filing fees or administrative costs due to indigency.
The issue was faced squarely by the Supreme Court in Griffin
v. Illinois.14 The petitioners sought to appeal their convictions for
armed robbery. They, however, could not pay the fee needed to
provide a report of the lower court proceedings. Only indigents
sentenced to death were provided with free transcripts for appeals.
Petitioners alleged that their indigency rather than the merit of
(Mr. Justice Brennan concurring); 401 U.S. at 389-94 (Mr. Justice Black
dissenting).
11. The question was brought as a class action on behalf of women
in Connecticut receiving welfare assistance and desiring to obtain a divorce
but barred from filing their petitions by the inability to pay filing and
service costs.
12. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
13. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have assistance of counsel for his defense.
14. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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their appeal had become the sole criterion for denying review of
their convictions. They contended that the use of this economic
determinant was a violation of the fourteenth amendment, due
process and equal protection clauses. The trial court and the Illi-
nois Supreme Court denied the petitioners' motion for free tran-
scripts. The United States Supreme Court reversed these lower
court decisions, holding that it was unconstitutional to deny re-
view, once provision for review had been made, solely on the in-
ability to pay a fee.15 Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated:
"plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational re-
lationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be
used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."' 6  The
Court reasoned that just as a criminal defendant cannot be barred
from the trial court because of indigency, "invidious discrimina-
tion" in the form of fees was unacceptable at the appellate level.
Interpreting the fourteenth amendment the Court concluded:
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. 1 7 Griffin clearly es-
tablished that access to the appellate courts, like the trial courts,
for the criminally accused could not be limited by the financial
hurdle of providing transcript costs.
In Burns v. Ohio,18 the Court began to expand the application
of Griffin by prohibiting the state from requiring an indigent to
pay filing fees before allowing him to file a motion for leave to ap-
peal. The Court declared: "The imposition by the State of finan-
cial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for in-
digent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal
Justice Under Law."1 9 Likewise, in Smith v. Bennett,20 the Su-
preme Court rejected the theory that a nominal fee of as little as
four dollars was an acceptable limitation on the docketing of an ap-
plication for a writ of habeas corpus.
Griffin, Burns, Smith and the subsequent Supreme Court rul-
ings in Lane v. Brown 2' and Gideon v. Wainwright22 firmly estab-
15. Id. at 18.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 19.
18. 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
19. Id. at 258.
20. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
21. 372 U.S. 477 (1963). The Court in Lane held that the State
must provide transcripts for coram nobis proceedings for indigents in ha-
beas corpus actions.
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The holding by the Court reversed Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), that a state's failure to furnish counsel to indi-
gents accused of a crime is not necessarily a deprivation of due process.
lished the principle that wealth and the ability to pay a fee are un-
acceptable criteria for not hearing an appeal. Denial of access to
any level of the criminal courts for indigence was found to be an
invidious discrimination much the same as race or religion, and
prohibited by the equal protection clause. 2  Although all of the
decisions dealt with criminal proceedings, the language of the
Court, particularly in Griffin,24 does not appear to be limited only
to criminal cases. Nevertheless, prior to Boddie the language of
the Court was applied only to criminal cases.
B. Access to the Courts in Civil Proceedings
Traditionally, access to the civil courts has been predicated on
the payment of specified costs and fees.25 Official charges such as
filing fees at trial and on appeal are costs to pay for the operation
of the court system. These charges, assessed against the individual
litigant, go toward salaries and maintenance of the physical plant
of the courts. Costs for the services of independent third parties
such as witnesses, printers and stenographers are termed auxiliary
or associate litigation costs. Again these costs are paid by the liti-
gant receiving the services. Another category of costs is the at-
torney fees and expenses. Finally, some proceedings necessitate
surety costs either as bonds or deposits. These costs are incurred
in creditor's suits for collateral, housing evictions, preliminary in-
junctions and appeals. Although these costs constituted a financial
barrier to the adjudication and enforcement of indigents rights, the
first access cases did not arise from these preconditions to litigation.
The great bulk of the early civil cases dealing with access to
the courts involved a defendant's right to be heard at trial in de-
fense of a property right.26  Typical of these first decisions was
Windsor v. McVeigh,27 where the Supreme Court reviewed the con-
fiscation of property of the defendant which stemmed from his ac-
tivity in the Confederacy. The Court ruled that since the defend-
ant was not heard due to lack of notice of the proceedings, he was
23. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
24. The Court stated:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would
deny the right to defend themselves at trial court and which ef-
fectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded
to all who have money enough to pay costs in advance.
Id. at 18. The Court also cautioned: "There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has." Id. at 19.
25. Goodplaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process
Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA
L. Rsv. 223 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goodplaster]; see also Blood,
Injunction Bonds: Equal Protection for the Indigent, 11 S. TEx. L.J. 16
(1969).
26. The Court in Boddie cited eighteen cases to illustrate due process
as applied to access. 401 U.S. at 377 n.3. Only one, Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965) involved a real property interest.
27. 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
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not afforded due process of law. The Court emphasized the right
to be heard: "A sentence of a court pronounced against a party
without hearing him, or giving him opportunity to be heard, is not
a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect
in any other tribunal. '28 The language of the court is clearly
broader than needed to require notice to a defendant of a threat
against his property.
None of these early access cases confronted the problem of a
party denied access to the courts because the litigant was unable to
pay filing cost or other fees.29 A partial explanation may have
been that a defendant, in most instances, needed only to appear in
court to defend his property. Actions by indigent plaintiffs ap-
parently never were instigated before the advent of free legal ser-
vices. The indigent plaintiff was without an alternative to extra-
legal settlement of his claim of rights.
As noted above3 ° eviction proceedings require that the defend-
ant-tenant meet a financial precondition before he may defend his
claim to occupancy. In State v. Sanks,31 the Supreme Court of
Georgia reviewed a statutory provision for a fee to defend. 2 The
statute prohibited the filing of an answer to an eviction without
the posting of a bond in an amount twice the rent. The court held
that the statute was valid. Relying on the United States Supreme
Court case of Jones v. Union Guarno,33 the Georgia court de-
clared:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
does not prevent a state from prescribing a reasonable and
appropriate condition precedent to bringing a suit of a spe-
cific kind or class so long as the basis of the distinction is
real and the condition imposed has a reasonable relation-
ship to a legitimate purpose.
3 4
However, in citing Union Guarno as authority for its decision, the
Georgia court did not consider possible distinctions. The condition
precedent in Union Guarno was that no suit for damages from re-
sults of the use of fertilizer may be brought except after chemical
analysis showing deficiency of ingredients. The Supreme Court
noted, "The act [requiring analysis] does not deprive the pur-
chaser of any right or cause of action. On the contrary, it gives
28. Id. at 277.
29. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
30. See Goodplaster, note 25 supra.
31. 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969); cf. Harrington v. Harrington,
269 A.2d 310 (Me. 1970).
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-301-02 (1966).
33. 264 U.S. 171 (1923).
34. Id. at 181.
additional rights and remedies. . .. ,,3" The effect of the Georgia
statute requiring filing fees for the indigent who was without the
amount required was more than limitation-it was total exclusion.
In addition, the litigant in Union Guarno supposedly effected ad-
versely was the plaintiff. The Georgia court was applying the rule
of Union Guarno to an indigent defendants. The Georgia Supreme
Court ignored the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Windsor v. McVeigh 36 regarding a defendant's right to be heard in
defense of his property.
Sanks went on appeal to the United States Supreme Court but
was dismissed when the state legislature amended the statute. The
Supreme Court had previously been asked to review this Georgia
law but refused in Williams v. Shaffer.3 7 The Williams case is
noteworthy because of the lengthy dissent to the majority's denial
of certiorari because of mootness. Mr. Justice Douglas applied the
rationale of Griffin v. Illinois3s to the merits of the case and con-
cluded that a civil defendant cannot be deprived of a hearing on
the merits in a dispossessory proceeding solely because of his in-
ability to post the defense bond.39
The evolution in criminal due process and equal protection re-
quirements began to have an impact upon the conduct of civil pro-
ceedings. Prior to Griffin there were no noteworthy cases chal-
lenging the financial barrier to access to civil courts confronting in-
dignent plaintiffs and certain indignent defendants.40 Justice Doug-
las' dissent provided a basis for future attempts to secure free ac-
cess. Illustrative of this trend toward broadening access to civil
courts was Jeffrey v. Jeffrey,41 a case with substantially the same
facts as Boddie. The indigent plaintiff petitioned the court for a
divorce and attempted to locate her husband to serve the summons.
Unsuccessful in attempting service, plaintiff obtained an order di-
recting payment of publication expenses by the city. The city of
New York asked that the order be withdrawn when it was deter-
mined that the publication cost would be three hundred dollars.
The Supreme Court refused to withdraw the order. The court ac-
cepted the plaintiff's argument that the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause does not differentiate between civil and
criminal litigants42 and applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court
35. Id. at 180.
36. 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
37. 385 U.S. 1037 (1967) (denying certiorari to 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d
668 (1966), (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
39. Justice Douglas expresses a position very close to that which the
Court adopted five years later in Lindsey v. Normet, 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972).
See text accompanying note 174 infra.
40. See cases cited at note 31 supra.
41. 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
42. Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 50 COL. L. REV. 131, 141, 167-68 (1950).
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in Griffin.4 3 The court concluded that preventing the plaintiff
from receiving a divorce because of the publication costs would be
invidious discrimination and that the indigent petitioner could not
be denied access to the divorce court because of her poverty with-
out violating the fourteenth amendment.
44
The holding of Jeffrey was not widely accepted thus necessitat-
ing the appeal of Boddie v. Connecticut. It is submitted that the
state courts and lower federal courts did not wish to expand the
due process and equal protection requirements of criminal cases to
civil proceedings before the Supreme Court took such action. It
remains clear, however, that despite the limited acceptance of
Griffin and its progeny 45 in civil actions, these cases were the cata-
lyst for attempts to expand free access in the civil courts.
III. THE CHALLENGE FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE CIVIL
COURTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT FOR INDIGENTS
A. Boddie v. Connecticut in the Federal District Court
The federal district court's decision in Boddie46 predated
the New York Supreme Court's decision in Jeffrey v. Jeffrey by
several months. Procedurally the cases were quite distinct.
47
This was due in part to Boddie's greater emphasis on the wider goal
of law reform for a whole class of persons, rather than a simple
remedy for a single litigant.48 The plaintiffs in Boddie attempted
to file for their divorces without paying the statutory fees.49 The
filing forms accompanied by motions to waive the fees were re-
jected by the clerk of the Superior Court of New Haven County.
After exhausting all other extra-legal means of avoiding the fees,
the plaintiffs sought relief5 0 in the form of a declaratory judgment
in the district court. The case was brought to a three judge panel
to expedite review to the Supreme Court.5 '
43. Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1050, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 84
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
44. Id.
45. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
46. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D. Conn. 1968).
47. Jeffrey v. Jeffrey, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
48. LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v.
Connecticut, 1971 DuKE L.J. 487, 492 (1971) [hereinafter cited as La-
France].
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-259-61 (Supp. 1971).
50. La France at 501.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) provides for a three judge district court
panel to hear suits seeking injunctive relief against unconstitutional state
The argument by the appellants in the district court consisted
of an attack on the constitutionality of the ailing statutes predi-
cated on the equal protection clause as applied in Griffin and the
due process clause as utilized in NAACP v. Button.52 The Button
decision involved the application of a Virginia statute53 restricting
persons and organizations from soliciting legal business for any at-
torney where that organization or person had no right at stake in
the litigation. The Supreme Court held that the statute as con-
strued and applied to bar law reform efforts by the NAACP vio-
lated first amendment 4 and fourteenth amendment rights. The
Court reasoned that the solicitation was a form of political expres-
sion protected by the first amendment. 5 Button was utilized by
the appellants in Boddie to establish the right to be heard based
on the similar right to petition for redress. 56
Although the district court in Boddie found "a classification of
prospective civil suitors between those able to afford the court
costs and those unable to afford them,"17 the district court denied
the relief sought. The court rejected the applicability of Griffin58
in civil proceedings because of "the differences between the right
to freedom from capital punishment or imprisonment and the right
to access to civil courts to adjust claims." 59 The district court did
not speak to the due process approach nor make any reference to
Button.
B. Boddie v. Connecticut in the United States Supreme Court
Two months after the federal district court delivered its de-
cision of July, 1968, a direct appeal was filed to the Supreme
Court.60 After argument in December, 1969, and March, 1970, the
Court asked for reargument before the "new" Court6 l in Novem-
ber, 1970, and March, 1971.
The essential position of the petitioners did not change sub-
stantially from the one taken in the lower court. The contention
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) provides for direct appeal of decisions of a
panel such as the one convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
52. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
53. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-74, -78-79 (1958).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides Congress shall make no laws re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of griev-
ances.
55. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
56. See LaFrance at 510.
57. 286 F. Supp. 968, 972 (D. Conn. 1968).
58. But cf. Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down lo-
cal poll taxes).
59. 286 F. Supp. 968, 972 (D. Conn. 1968).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
61. Chief Justice Warren was replaced by Chief Justice Burger and
Mr. Justice Fortas was replaced by Mr. Justice Blackmun, subsequent to
the original argument of the case.
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remained that the fees as applied to plaintiffs constituted an eco-
nomic discrimination violative of the equal protection clause.
6 2
The appellants did, however, put greater emphasis on the adoption
of wealth as a "suspect criteria" for classification of litigants.6 3
Appellants relied on Shapiro v. Thompson 4 for support. In
Shapiro the Court found that the residency waiting period require-
ment for welfare eligibility created two classes of needy residents.
The only factor distinguishing one group from the other was the
term of residence. The Court held the distinction unacceptable
and the classification violative of fifth amendment due process re-
quirements. 5
Why the appellants utilized Shapiro to establish wealth as a
suspect criterion is not clear. The Court at no point in the Shapiro
case explicitly stated this proposition. Justice Harlan, in dissent,
noted the classification:
The criterion of wealth was added to the list of sus-
pects as an alternative justification for the rationale in
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec. [cite omitted]. Today the
list apparently has been further enlarged to include classi-
fications based upon recent interstate movement.6 6
Mr. Justice Harlan refused to accept either wealth or term of resi-
dency as a suspect criterion.
67
Although Shapiro is not conclusive as establishing wealth as a
suspect criterion for classification, it remains an important case for
indigent litigants. The Court in striking down welfare residency
requirements extended the parameters of that group of rights
fundamental enough to require judicial scrutiny when impaired.
Even Justice Harlan, dissenting in Shapiro, agreed that "the right
to travel is a fundamental right which for present purposes, should
be regarded as having its source in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment."6' 8 Thus, indigent plaintiffs could maintain that
if the scope of fundamental rights was wide enough to encompass
the right to travel interstate, then the right to be heard in court
should be within these protected fundamental rights. This possi-
ble proposition was not argued by the appellants.6 9
62. See LaFrance at 511.
63. Id. at 512.
64. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
65. Id. at 631-32.
66. 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 634-38.
68. Id. at 671.
69. See LaFrance at 511.
C. Boddie v. Connecticut-the Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Holding of the Court
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited application
of the Connecticut statutes requiring a filing fee and costs for ser-
vice of process. The Court held that such application denied the
appellants a hearing on their divorces, not for insufficiency in the
merits of their petitions but solely on their inability to pay the re-
quired fees. Support for the holding that this violated due process
was offered in the form of the prior "access" cases dealing with
procedural due process with regard to notice. 0 Application of the
due process standard was based on three principles. First, mar-
riage is a fundamental human relationship71 occupying a basic posi-
tion in society's hierarchy of values.7 2 Second, the state in this
area of conflict resolution has a complete monopoly and is thus
"the only forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes."
7' 8
Third, the claimed right to dissolution of their marriages is a pro-
tected right, interference in the exercise of which is constitution-
ally prohibited.
74
In concluding the opinion, Justice Harlan placed great empha-
sis on limiting the holding to the facts.
We go no further than necessary to dispose of the case be-
fore us, a case where bona fides of both the appellant's in-
digency and desire for divorce are here beyond dispute.
We do not decide that access for all individuals to the
courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
so that exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any
individual, for as already noted, in the case before us this
right is preconditioned to the adjustment of a fundamental
human relationship.
7 5
In Boddie, the Court delivered an interpretation of the due
process clause that is of great benefit for indigent litigants. This
result is emphasized by the explicit intent of the Court to decide
the issue of access as the Court itself narrowly framed it in the
context of the specific fact situation. However, the concluding
language does not expressly foreclose the possibility that other
circumstances may exist where exercise of the right to access may
not be limited. Although the holding may be limited by the con-
clusion, the underlying reasoning cannot be pared 'down and re-
70. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
71. Boddie v. Connecticut, 701 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
72. Id. at 374.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 380-81. Justice Harlan suggested as protected rights the
ones of religious freedom, free speech and freedom of assembly enumer-
ated in the first amendment. See note 54 supra.
75. 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
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stricted so easily. Thus, the decision poses for analysis the proposi-
tion that the rationale of Boddie goes beyond divorce and "cannot
and should not be limited to either its facts or its language."7 6 A
determination of the validity of this proposition requires that the
language and reasoning of the Court be examined and that the
separate opinions be contrasted.
2. Analysis of the Majority's Due Process Approach
In words not unlike those used by the Commission on Civil
Disorders,77 the majority opened the opinion by emphasizing the
necessity for a legal system to resolve conflicts in an orderly, pre-
dictable manner. Justice Harlan explained:
Without such a legal system, social organization and co-
hesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek
regularized resolution of conflicts individuals are capable
of interdependent action that enables them to strive for
achievement without the anxieties that would beset them
in a disorganized society.
78
The Court continued, constructing a theoretical framework by
pointing out that the courts and other quasi official bodies are the
ultimate sources of conflict resolution. This fact necessitates adop-
tion of a due process concept in the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.
Mr. Justice Harlan noted the unique nature of the claim to be
heard in Boddie. The litigants were not defendants and the con-
troversy did not concern property rights. The Court reasoned that
other claims of rights were capable of settlement without resort to
the judicial process. In these instances the state does not deny due
process in refusing access to the courts because the Court felt
"effective alternatives for the adjustment of differences remain."79
Conversely, if the state were to bar access where there exists no
effective means of alternative adjustment, the due process clause
would invalidate the state action. The Court asserted this proposi-
tion without offering specific authority for support.
Violation of the above due process standard requires a finding
of two facts. First, the interest litigated must be within those
rights protected by the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.8 0
76. Meltzer v. LeCraw, 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting
from a denial of certiorari).
77. See, authority cited note 2 supra at 5-11.
78. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
79. Id. at 376.
80. Id. at 379.
Second, the interest threatened must not be capable of effective
adjustment by private structuring and repair.81 For Justice Harlan
and the Court, these two elements are all that is necessary to find
a denial of the right to be heard protected by the due process
clause. The Court found these two elements present in Boddie.82
Authority offered as support for the contention that the right
to a divorce is within the group of rights and interests protected
by the fourteenth amendment is quite sparse. Citing three prior
Supreme Court decisions,83 the Court asserted that marriage in-
volves interests of basic importance in our society. 4 The Court in-
terpreted these cases to allow for the right to dissove marriages
and remarry because there is undisputedly the right to marry.85
This conclusion tacitly dismisses the state's argument that di-
vorces should be discouraged and not be as favored as marriage
in the operation of law. 6
The opinion incorporates the notion of the right to divorce into
the general concept of the right to be heard. This was attempted
by likening the plaintiffs to defendants called into court to defend
a property interest, because the plaintiffs in Boddie have no alter-
native means of adjudicating their rights. Resort to the judicial
process for plaintiffs like Gladys Boddie "is not the paramount
dispute settlement technique but, in fact, the only available one."
'8 7
The analogy of defendants called to defend an interest and plain-
tiffs in a divorce is not a true one. A defendant in a civil suit has
the opportunity to settle the controversy out of court. The plain-
tiff petitioning for a divorce cannot secure a divorce without resort
to the court from start to finish. For parties seeking to separate,
terminate their marriage and be free to marry again there is no out
of court settlement.
88
81. Id. at 376.
82. Id. at 382-83.
83. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). "The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men"; Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex ret. William-
son, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). "We are dealing with legislation which in-
volves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). "Without doubt it [fourteenth amend-
ment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily constraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any common occupation of life,
to acquire knowledge, to marry ... and generally to enjoy privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."
84. 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
85. This line of reasoning suggests that an indigent could secure
waiver of marriage license fees.
86. 286 F. Supp. 968, 974 (D. Conn. 1968) (District Court refers to
Government argument at note 6).
87. 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971).
88. See Note, Supreme Court 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3 (1971)
"This rationale is unpersuasive, however, for [civil] defendants can and
do settle law suits against them." Id. at 107.
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Mr. Justice Harlan distilled from the early access cases and
the history of due process generally a due process test slightly dif-
ferent from the one suggested earlier"9 in the opinion.
[A]bsent a countervailing state interest of overriding sig-
.nificance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and
duty through the judicial process must be given a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard.90
This standard is narrower because it adds the finding of no state
interest of overriding significance before due process will invali-
date state action. In Boddie, the purposes of raising revenue and
discouraging frivolous claims were dismissed91 on the rationale of
Griffin.
9 2
Thus the restatement of the due process standard did not ef-
fectively alter the central requirement of finding a protected right
threatened and a monopoly by the state for effective resolution of
the particular conflict. As noted above, the claimed right to a dis-
solution of their marriages was found to be such a protected in-
terest.9 3 The remaining element required for application of the
due process standard was a finding of exclusive state control of
effective settlement. The Court had no difficulty with this deter-
mination:
Even where all substantive requirements are concededly
met, we know of no instance where two consenting adults,
may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the
constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and
more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage,
without the state judicial machinery.
94
The circumstances in Boddie evidence the two requirements
necessary for application of the due process test suggested by Jus-
tice Harlan-that the interest litigated is a right protected and that
there is no effective alternative to the courts. However, mild
criticism can be leveled at the distinct dearth of authority for
some of the initial premises concerning the right to divorce 95 and
importance of exclusive state control.9 6 However, this is not the
cause for the split in the Court and the separate opinions. Rather
the attempt to limit the holding to only divorce in like circum-
89. See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
90. 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
91. Id. at 381-82.
92. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
93. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
94. 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
95. Id. at 381 n.8. See also text accompanying note 79 supra.
96. Id. at 375-76.
stances and the use of the due process clause to the exclusion of the
equal protection clause generated the concurring opinions.
3. The Equal Protection Approach
Mr. Justice Douglas did not accept due process as the sole basis
for a determination that the statutes requiring the fees were un-
constitutional. Concurring, Justice Douglas argued that the case
ought to be decided upon the principles developed in the line of
cases marked by Griffin v. Illinois.97 He further stated that Boddie
was comparable to Smith v. Bennett.98 There the Court held
that compelling indigents to pay filing fees before a writ of habeas
corpus could be considered in state court was invalid under the
equal protection clause. Justice Douglas reiterated his agreement 9
with the theory that there should be no distinction between civil
and criminal proceedings in the application of the equal protection
clause. o1 0
Although Justice Douglas did not think the majority was in-
correct in applying the due process clause, he felt it was unwise to
employ only the due process protection. Justice Douglas expressed
his distaste for what he deemed a subjective standard by noting
that "the Due Process Clause on which the Court relies has proven
very elastic in the hands of judges."10' Justice Douglas offered as
examples of this subjectivity Lochner v. New York, 10 2 Coppage
v. Kansas.'03 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital10 4 where he be-
lieved the "idiosyncrasies" of the individual judges prevailed. In
each of the cases the question was whether the claimed right was
within that group of rights and interests protected by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments.
Justice Douglas alternatively urged acceptance of the appel-
lants' proposition that wealth become a suspect criterion for classifi-
cation. The Court had already designated race,10 5 religion,1 0 6 caste
or class 0 7 suspect criteria, and Justice Douglas argued that the
holdings of Griffin, Burns, and Douglas v. California'° added
wealth to this list. In the latter case the Court held that "[i]n
either case [Griffin or Douglas] the evil is the same discrimination
97. Id. at 383.
98. 365 U.S. 708 (1961); see also text accompanying note 20 supra.
99. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
100. Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 50 COL. L. REV. 131 (1950).
101. 401 U.S. 371, 384 (1971).
102. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
103. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
104. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
105. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1878).
106. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
107. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
108. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
against the indigent."109 Justice Douglas found that the law as ap-
plied in Connecticut did not grant a petition for divorce on the
merits alone but also on the ability to pay a fee. The obtaining of
a hearing for a divorce necessitated only the latter. For Justice
Douglas the granting or denying of a divorce on the ability to pay
the fee was invidious discrimination barred by the equal protection
clause. The dividing of petitioners into two groups, one successful
and one unsuccessful, not on the merits but on the basis of their
ability to pay the fees was a classification on the suspect criterion
of wealth.
The implication of finding wealth a suspect criterion would be
sweeping. Every abridgment of a right or interest because of the
inability to meet a financial obligation, either fees or costs, would
be immediately brought under the scrutiny of the court." 0 In ad-
dition, a classification based on a suspect criterion must overcome
the presumption that the classification is unconstitutional.1 '
Adoption of wealth as a suspect criterion would have application
well beyond -divorce. It would bar all fee requirements that pre-
empt access to the judicial process in its application to indigents.
4. Integrated Due Process and Equal Protection Approach
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, occupied the mid-
dle ground between the exclusively due process and exclusively
equal protection approaches." 2 There is no disagreement between
Justices Brennan and Douglas in applying the equal protection
clause. Justice Brennan explained:
The rationale of Griffin covers the present case. Courts
are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society.
They are bound to do equal justice under the law to rich
and poor alike. They fail to perform their function in ac-
cordance with the Equal Protection Clause if they shut
their doors to the plaintiffs altogether. Where money de-
termines not merely "the kind of trial a man gets" Griffin
v. Illinois, supra, 351 U.S. at 19, but whether he gets into
court at all the great principle of equal protection becomes
a mockery. 1 3
Whereas Justice Brennan's position was indistinguishable from
Justice Douglas' on equal protection, he was not in complete accord
with the limits suggested by the majority in utilization of due
109. Id. at 355.
110. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. Id.
112. 401 U.S. 371, 386-89 (1971).
113. Id. at 388-89.
process. Justice Brennan could 'discern no constitutional distinc-
tion between appellant's attempt to enforce a statutory right and
any other right. He stated that "[t]he right to be heard in some
way at some time extends to all proceedings entertained by courts.
The possible distinctions suggested by the Court today will not
withstand analysis."' 14 Although Justice Brennan did not expli-
citly offer a reason why every proceeding entertained by courts
might be included, one rationale is apparent." 5 It is submitted
that every person claiming a right or interest enjoys that right or
interest because it is enforceable in a court of law. Observance of
the right or interest by others is largely a result of the right being
enforceable. As the majority suggests, many claims of right are re-
solved without resort to judicial process but by employing "effec-
tive alternatives for the adjustment of differences."'" 6 The ma-
jority contended that the indigent plaintiff who was unable to go
to court was not denied due process because effective alternatives
exist for causes of action other than divorce. Difficulty arises with
this theory in practice.
A paradox exists in the relationship between judicial and ex-
tra judicial resolution of conflict. When access to the judicial proc-
ess is available, the effective alternative means are viable as a
method of effectively resolving conflict. Paradoxically, when ac-
cess is barred and the extra-judicial means of resolution are needed,
the alternative means are no longer effective. Removal of the pos-
sibility of taking the dispute to court because of an inability to pay
filing fees, leaves the indigent plaintiff without any leverage with
which to negotiate. The "effective" alternative becomes dysfunc-
tional if the indigent has no judicial alternative to the offer of his
adversary. The indigent must take what is offered in accounting
for his claim or take nothing. Only when the right to be heard in
some way at some time extends to all proceedings entertained by
courts will extra-judicial means be effective alternatives to settle-
ment of disputes involving indigents.
Thus, since effective alternative means are non-existent, the
monopoly condition would exist and the due process clause would
be invoked. This pragmatic view would support the conclusion of
Justice Brennan that all claims ought to be heard in some fashion.
Despite the concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Bren-
nan, the majority of the Court did not even comment on the equal
protection rationale. It is submitted that the Court may have done
tacitly what Justice Douglas did expressly. Justice Douglas recog-
114. Id. at 387-88.
115. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). "Under the condi-
tions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable
avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." Id. at
429-30.
116. 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
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nized due process as being applicable but that equal protection, also
applicable, was the better approach. Conversely, the Court may
have accepted the applicability tacitly by not commenting against
the concurring opinions but by adopting the due process approach as
being more suitable. Justice Brennan's acceptance and application
of both is more flexible and balanced in approaching Boddie and
future controversies.
5. The First Amendment Approach to Access
The appellants in Boddie did not claim the right that was af-
forded them by the Court's decision. Counsel for the petitioners
believed that the indigent plaintiffs did not have a right to a di-
vorce as such. Rather, appellants claimed that they had a first
amendment right to petition for redress." 7  This "basic liberty"
found in the Bill of Rights was hoped to be more welcome to the
Court than the novel claim of a right to a divorce. Accepting ac-
cess to the judicial process itself as a protected right would achieve
a result as broad as that suggested by Justice Brennan. Any right
or interest would be relieved of the burden of facing the subjective
test of being found a fundamental protected right. Access to the
courts, as the right to be protected would be secured by hearing the
indigent's claim in every instance. The elimination of the subjec-
tive test would also allay the objections of Justice Douglas.118
In reviewing the theoretical framework 1 9 offered by the Court
it is difficult to discern why the majority passed over the enumer-
ated right of the first amendment in favor of the right to dissolve
one's marriage. 120 Certainly, the former fits more readily with the
examples of protected rights. 12' The reason must be akin to the
rationale of Justice Black in a subsequent decision. Justice Black
explained the action by suggesting that the Court wished to pro-
ceed "slowly step-by-step so that the country will have time to ab-
sorb its [Boddie's] full import."'
1 2 2
117. See LaFrance. "Even though the appellants had no constitutional
right to divorce, they had a right to seek to petition for divorce. The
right to petition was itself constitutionally assured, quite apart from
whether the relief sought was constitutionally guaranteed." Id. at 513.
118. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
119. 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
120. Goodplaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process
Standards and the Indigent's Right to Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA
L. REV. 223, 240-41 (1970). Justice Harlan has expressed greater willing-
ness to afford due process protection to "basic liberties" rather than "fun-
damental rights," a term associated with equal protection.
121. 401 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1971).
122. Meltzer v. LeCraw, 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971) (Black, J., dissent-
ing from a denial of certiorari).
IV. THE DEVELOPING CHALLENGE FOR FREE ACCESS TO THE
COURTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
Boddie v. Connecticut guarantees clear access to the judicial
process for a hearing on the petition of many indigent plain-
tiffs. If this were the only benefit derived from the decision
it would be a limited achievement in terms of a test case to effect
law reform. Such a limited affect has not been evident thus far.
Boddie has become both an alternative rationale for other cases in-
volving access and a generator of new challenges. The remainder
of this Note will review and assess the developing challenge for
free access. Four basic civil fee and cost barriers to the judicial
process are considered in light of recent cases. These financial pre-
conditions to litigation are: trial filing fees and costs; trial surety
costs; appellate filing fees and costs; and appellate surety costs.
A. Trial Filing Fees and Costs
Typical of challenges against filing fees have been attempts to
have free access to the courts for filing of petitions in bankruptcy.
Subsequent to Boddie the Supreme Court refused to review 123 an
unsuccessful attack on such a filing fee in In re Garland.12 4 Gar-
land was among eight access cases considered by the Court for re-
view.12' Two of the cases were reversed and remanded, 126 and re-
view was denied to five appeals. 127 The Court agreed to hear only
Lindsey v. Normet.128 The general denial of certiorari elicited a
lengthy and vigorous dissent from Justice Black who argued that
all eight of the cases ought to be heard in light of Boddie because
that decision should not be limited to its facts or the concluding
language of the Court.'29 Justice Black urged that tort claims and
bankruptcy relief be accepted as fundamental to an orderly society
and at least as important as the right to divorce. 13 Justice Black
concluded that "[t]he civil courts of the United States belong to
the people of this country and that no person can be denied access
to these courts, either for trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay
123. Id.
124. 428 F.2d 1185 (lst Cir. 1970).
125. 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
126. Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969); Sloat-
man v. Gibbons, 448 P.2d 124 (1968).
127. In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (lst Cir. 1970); Beverly v. Scotland
Urban Enterprises, 255 La. 346, 230 So. 2d 837 (1971); Bourbeau v. Lancas-
ter, Super. Ct., Conn. (1971); Carter v. Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1971); Meltzer v. LeCraw, 225 Ga. 91, 166 S.E.2d 88 (1969).
128. 402 U.S. 941 (1971).
129. 402 U.S. 954, 957 n.2 (1971). Justice Black still reserved some
doubts about the rationale of Boddie but accepted it as law. "I would ei-
ther overrule Boddie at once or extend the benefits of government paid
costs to other civil litigants whose interests are at least as important




a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty or afford to hire an attor-
ney."
131
In Garland the plaintiffs sought a waiver of the filing fees for
a petition in bankruptcy. The plaintiffs contended that refusal to
give indigents a bankruptcy discharge without payment of fees was
a denial of due process.' 3 2 The First Circuit Court refused to adopt
this reasoning, arguing that bankruptcy was not a right but a
privilege and that reasonable conditions could be attached to the
granting of such privileges. 13 The court in Garland also relied on
the fact that the fifty dollar filing fee was reasonably related to
the service because it paid for the service.1 34 This type of fee "as
a mechanism of resource allocation or cost recoupment . . . was of-
fered and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois."''1 The decision in Gar-
land stands for the proposition that the privilege of a discharge in
bankruptcy can be denied without violation of due process by ap-
plication of a fee requirement. Federal courts in the Second, 136
Ninth18 7 and Tenth Circuits"8 confronted with the same issues
and facts have reached the opposite conclusion.
In re Kras'39 followed both the district court's decision in Gar-
land and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. The district
court in Kras accepted the explanation offered by Justice Black
that such denial resulted from the Court's desire to proceed "slowly
step by step.' ' 4 0 The Court rejected completely the reasoning of
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Garland and added equal
protection to due process as a reason for waiving the fees as a
matter of right. The Court concluded:
This court can only agree that the proper interpretation
of Boddie requires that as applied to petitioners herein, the
statutory requirements of prepayment of a filing fee to ob-
tain discharge in bankruptcy violates his Fifth Amend-
ment right of due process including equal protection.'-
4
The basic proposition, separating the First Circuit from the
131. Id.
132. 428 F.2d 1185, 1187 (lst Cir. 1970); applying, 11 U.S.C.A. § 24,
Bankruptcy Act § 6 (1966).
133. 428 F.2d 1185, 1188 (lst Cir. 1970).
134. See In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The court in
Kras noted that filing fees did not approximate operating costs and that in
1970 there was a $4,531,466. deficit. Id. at 1214.
135. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
136. In re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
137. In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971).
138. In re Smith, 322 F. Supp. .1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
139. 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
140. Id. at 1211.
141. Id. at 1212.
other circuits noted, it that court's insistence that bankruptcy is a
privilege not a right.14 2 The court, in Garland, concluded that
privileges can be granted subject to a fee requirement. The dis-
trict court in In re Smith 141 dismissed this reasoning asserting that
the distinction between right and privilege was irrelevant. 14 4 The
court assessed the importance of the interest of the petitioner with-
out regard to right-privilege distinctions. The court explained that
"[w]e disagree that the interest of an assetless person is neces-
sarily less important than one who has $50 for a filing fee and few,
or no, assets to be divided among creditors. 11 45 This is essentially
the reasoning of Justice Brennan in Boddie, that all proceedings
entertained by courts must be heard in some fashion.
A decision of the Supreme Court is needed to resolve this split
of authority within the federal system. It is submitted that the
denial of review to Garland and the granting of certiorari to Kras
possibly forecasts the Supreme Court's decision in Kras. The
Court's action in granting the appeal could indicate a willingness
to correct Kras while allowing the holding in Garland to stand.1 40
If this were true a reversal of Kras could be expected which would
impede the process of indigents toward free access.
B. Injunction Bonds
An injunction will be issued under proper conditions to re-
strain such actions as the sale of personal property to satisfy a
landlord's lien or the recovery of possession of property under for-
cible entry and detainer.1 47 One of the conditions for the injunc-
tive relief is the posting of the requisite injunction bond prior to
the granting of the writ.148 In many instances the indigent is un-
able to post any security and a judicial determination of his prop-
erty right is precluded by this financial requirement.
As noted above, 14 the Supreme Court twice refused to hear
cases concerning the constitutionality of forcible entry and detainer
statutes in Williams v. Shaffer and State v. Sanks. Both cases were
determined to be mooted, by eviction in the former and a statutory
amendment in the latter. In Williams Justice Douglas and Chief
142. In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185, 1187 (1st Cir. 1970).
143. 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Col. 1971).
144. Id. at 1090.
145. Id.
146. See United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). Decisions
not to grant certiorari are not to be taken as decisions on the merits.
147. Blood, Injunction Bonds: Equal Protection for the Indigent, 11
S. TEx. L.J. 16 (1969).
148. See FLA. STAT. c. 64, § 6403 (1955); MD. R. Civ. P. BB 75; ORs.
REv. STAT. § 19.040(1) (1969) provides in part: "The undertaking of the
appellant shall be given with one or more sureties, to the effect that the ap-
pellant will pay all damages, costs and disbursements which may be
awarded against him on appeal .. "
149. See text accompanying notes 31, 37 supra.
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Justice Warren wished to review the law 10 because the statute
"apparently violates the Equal Protection Clause by patently dis-
criminating against the poor." 15 1 Other members of the Court may
have agreed with the position of Justice Douglas on constitution-
ality but also recognized mootness as cause not to hear the appeal.
In dismissing the appeal in Sanks, Justice Harlan spoke ap-
provingly of the changes in the Georgia law concerning forcible
entry and detainer.2 The changes in the statutory scheme elimi-
nated the petitioners' objections to the statutes and alleviated the
financial barrier of the initial bond in order to defend. The tenant
now merely answers the execution affidavit either orally or in
writing. If litigation cannot be completed within a month of exe-
cution of the landlord's affidavit, the tenant may retain possession
by paying into court all rent as it becomes due.'
53
Although concerned with the double appeal bond aspects of
the Oregon forcible entry and detainer statute' 4 which required
the defendant to post bond in an amount equal to twice the value
of the property in question, the Supreme Court decision in Lindsey
v. Normet 55 applies to some extent to injunction bonds at trial
level. The Court stated that ". . . [a] State may properly take
steps to insure that the appellant post adequate security before an
appeal to preserve the property at issue."'5 6  Application of this
reasoning at the trial level would mean assurance that rent as it
accrues will not be lost. The Georgia statute does this by having
the tenant pay into court.
In Lindsey, the Supreme Court applied the rationale of Grif-
fin to strike down the double bond provisions of the forcible entry
and detainer statute. 157 The double bond requirement did not re-
late reasonably to the merits of the appeal or the damage suffered
by the landlord. It is submitted that if the appeal bond must bear
some reasonable relationship to the possible damages then the
initial bond must also. This would apply to the landlord's lien as
well. The tenant there ought to be allowed to answer in a manner
like the scheme proposed in the Georgia forcible entry and de-
tainer statute. The bond should not foreclose access to defend but
150. GA, CODE ANN. fit. 61, §§ 301-6 (1966).
151. 385 U.S. 1037, 1041 (1967).
152. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 61, §§ 301-6 (1970).
153. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 61, §§ 303-4 (1970).
154. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 105.105-105.160 (1969).
155. 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972).
156. Id. at 876.
157. Id.
only secure the property in question. 5 8 It is submitted that fu-
ture appeals in the order of Williams, if not mooted, will be suc-
cessful in light of the dismissal in Sanks, and the collateral holding
in Lindsey that the only valid requirement the state may impose
to defend is one which insures the preservation of the property at
issue.
C. Appellate Fees and Costs
Indigent appellants have had some degree of success in attain-
ing free access for appeals in civil courts. Based directly on Boddie
the Connecticut district court in Gatling v. Butler'5 9 invalidated a
fee barrier in a juvenile proceeding. The court noted:
If it is constitutionally impossible to bar access to the
courts of Connecticut by an indigent party for adjudication
of her right to a divorce, a fortiori, an indigent juvenile
may not be deprived of an appeal in its courts from a
state's adjudication that she is a juvenile delinquent be-
cause she is financially unable to pay court fees which are
required to enter an appeal.' 6 0
The decision of the Connecticut court does not broaden Boddie
to any great extent, since the interest threatened in this quasi-
criminal procceding is as fundamental as divorce. The reversal
and remand of Frederick v. Schwartz'6 ' by the United States Su-
preme Court, however, does indicate Boddie goes beyond divorce in
the area of civil appeals. In Frederick, the district court of Con-
necticut held that the requirement of a seven dollar entry fee did
not violate a welfare recipient's constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection.0 2 The petitioners sought free access to ap-
peal a welfare commissioner's rulings. The district court followed
the reasoning of Boddie v. Connecticut as decided by the district
court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for considera-
tion in light of the decision in Boddie. It is submitted that this ac-
tion must indicate that the Boddie holding does go beyond divorce
and apply to other circumstances where access may not be pre-
empted by the requirement of an appeal filing fee.
Another major cost confronting the indigents on appeal, and
often forcing the appellant out of court, is the fee for transcripts
of the record. In Rowe v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County 163
the appellant sought and received the waiver of transcript costs for
an appeal of a denial in the modification of child support. How-
158. See text accompanying note 28 supra. The civil access cases
dealing with procedural due process support the reasoning since they simi-
larly involve the defense of property. Cf. note 181 infra.
159. 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971).
160. Id. at 397.
161. 402 U.S. 386 (1971).
162. 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969).
163. 94 Cal. Rptr. 398, 484 P.2d 70 (1971).
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ever, the Supreme Court of California was not concerned with the
question whether indigents must be given funds by the county to
pay transcript fees. Rather, the court dealt only with the inherent
power of the appellate court to waive its own filing fees to accom-
modate indigent civil litigants.6 4 This power existed in the opin-
ion of the court.165 Had the court decided the former question, the
ability of indigents to carry appeals would have been assured. The
question whether appeal costs must be waived as a matter of right
was confronted and answered by District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Lee v. Habib.
6 6
The indigent in Lee v. Habib sought a court order to require
the District of Columbia to pay for a transcript for an appeal from
a suit for possession. Tracing the evolution of indigent rights in
appeal procedures from Griffin through Gideon and Douglas, the
court applied the equal protection clause to the civil proceeding as
it had been utilized in criminal cases. Judge Wright, writing for
the majority explained:
It is the importance of the right [threatened] to the indi-
vidual not the technical distinction between civil and crim-
inal which should be of importance to a court in deciding
what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.
. . . Often the poor litigant will have more at stake in a
civil case than in a criminal case. 16 7
Gatling v. Butler and Lee v. Habib illustrate once more the
problem that the courts have had defining the roles of the due
process and equal protection clauses. As in Boddie, the judges in
Gatling and Habib are in disagreement as to the means of achieving
the end of access. It is submitted that it is an unrealistic and futile
exercise to attempt to divorce the two clauses in the context of ac-
cess.168 The integrated approach of Justice Brennan is the better
view.
169
164. Id. at 72.
165. Id. at 72-3.
166. 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
167. Id. at 901.
168. Note, The Demise of Right Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HAv. L. REV. 1439, 1456 (1968):
A systematic review of the equal protection and due process lines
of cases would, I believe, readily establish that the constitutional
tests of "arbitrary classifications" are rapidly becoming indistin-
guishable from the constitutional test of "unreasonable regulation"
under the due process clause. Indeed, it is fair to say that the two
clauses have almost merged. . . . The greatest circumvention of
the distinction [right from privilege] has been achieved via the
equal protection clause. Under that clause it seemingly makes no
difference that the threatened interest is a privilege rather than a
right.
169. See text accompanying notes 112-15 supra.
D. Appellate Bonds
The remaining financial obstacle considered herein is the right
of an indigent to appeal an adverse judgment without posting ap-
peal bond. These bonds are required to protect the judgment of
the appellee. Challenges questioning the constitutionality of these
bonds have met with mixed results. The Supreme Court of Dela-
ware, in State ex rel. Caulk v. Nichols,1 0 rejected an attack on a
state bond statute.171 The petitioners in an argument, based on
Boddie, asserted that they were deprived of "the fundamental right
to litigate. 71 2  The court disagreed, declaring that "[a]dmittedly,
they have had a trial in a court which had jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter. We find no ground for holding that they have been
deprived of a right to trial."'
173
Although due process does not require review, equal protection
demands that once afforded, it cannot be denied arbitrarily by
some economic barrier. This was the rationale in the criminal ap-
peal in Griffin. It is submitted that since the civil courts are occa-
sionally in error, like criminal courts, the necessity for review is
present whether the money for bond is or is not present. As in
criminal cases, if review is granted by statute to any, it ought not
be limited by any criterion outside the merits of the appeal.
The most substantial inroad into overcoming appeal bonds as a
barrier to the appellate courts for indigents came in the recent Su-
preme Court decision of Lindsey v. Normet.1.7 4 In Lindsey, the ap-
pellants were occupying a single family residence on a month to
month lease when a dispute arose concerning repairs. Alleging
that they were unable to get the repairs, appellants ceased paying
rent. Prior to statutory eviction proceedings, the appellant sought
a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the Oregon
Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute (FED), 175' and in-
junctive relief against continued enforcement of the law. The ap-
pellants maintained, inter alia, that the provision for a bond for
twice the rent in addition to the regular appeal bond,176 as ap-
plied, was violative of their due process and equal protection
rights. The appellants did not attack the constitutionality of the
regular appeal bond that provided merely for the posting of a
bond equal to the accruing rent.17 7 Justice White, writing for the
Court, applied the rationale of Griffin that if an appeal is allowed
at all, it must be fairly administered. In this regard the double
170. 281 A.2d 24 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1971); cf. Harrington v. Harrington,
269 A.2d 310 (Me. 1970).
171. DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 9578, 9578 (b,d) (Supp. 1964).
172. 281 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 1971).
173. Id.
174. 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972).
175. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 105.105-105.160 (1969).
176. ORE. REV. STAT. § 19.040; see also note 148 supra.
177. Cf. note 152 supra.
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rent bond was lacking because it was not related to the objective
of protecting the landlord. 17 Justice White concluded: "The dis-
crimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an
appeal but cannot post the double bond is particularly obvious.
For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter how
meritorious their case may be." 79 This discrimination was termed
"arbitrary and irrational"'' 80 and the Court found the statute in-
validated by the equal protection clause.'"
In Lindsey the petitioner sought access to the judicial process
to defend a property interest. Although not concerned with prop-
erty rights itself, Boddie was based on due process cases that re-
quired access for defendants to protect property interests. The
only factual difference is that Lindsey seeks access at the appellate
level and Boddie sought access to the judicial process at the trial
level. This difference cannot account for the fact that in treating
access in Lindsey no reference was made by the Court to their ac-
cess decision in Boddie.'82 It is submitted that the reason must be
that Boddie was decided on due process grounds and Lindsey on
equal protection. However, with factual contexts so similar it is
difficult to reason why the Court chose to decide one on equal pro-
tection and the other on due process.
Despite this confusion, several determinations are clear. First,
the Court is now willing to apply the principles and case law of the
criminal due process cases of Griffin and its progeny to civil litiga-
tion. Lindsey may surplant Boddie as the breakthrough in civil
access for indigents if it is expanded and extended as was Griffin.
Second, even if not extended, Lindsey offers a standard for appeal
bonds. Appeal bonds may do no more than protect an appellee's
judgment or property. Third, the language of the Court in conclud-
ing may indicate that appeal bonds that foreclose, as a practical
matter, appeals of merit are suspect.
8 3
V. CONCLUSION
In Boddie v. Connecticut the Supreme Court held that filing
and service of process fees could not become a bar to access to the
178. 92 S. Ct. 862, 876 (1972).
179. Id. at 877.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. See also note 122 supra. Justice Black makes a connection
between all the cases considered for review. Justice Black would have
granted certiorari to all on the basis of Boddie.
183. 92 S. Ct. 862, 876-77 (1972).
divorce courts because of an indigent's inability to pay the fee.
The Court at the time said that the holding was limited to the facts
in the case. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Frederick v.
Schwartz,'i 4 and the United States District Court for Connecticut
in Gatling v. Butler,18 5 held that appeal filing fees cannot pre-
empt the right to appeal because the appellant is unable to pay the
'filing fee. Frederick and Gatling were explicitly founded on Bod-
die. All three cases were based on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
In Lindsey v. Normet, the Court ruled that the Oregon statute
requiring a bond for an amount twice the accrued rent, in addition
to a general appeal bond, was unconstitutional. The Court ruled
that the bond as it operated was an arbitrary and irrational dis-
crimination against the poor and violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is submitted that there is
no evident rationale for the Court to decide any of these cases on
the basis of either equal protection or due process to the complete
exclusion of the other.
The explanation that the Court decided Boddie on the basis of
the due process clause and attempted to limit the holding to di-
vorce to allow the courts gradually to accommodate free access is no
longer tenable. The decision in Lindsey v. Normet, predicated on
the reasoning of Griffin v. Illinois, removes the restrictions of the
due process clause that would allow access to develop fundamen-
tal right by fundamental right. Lindsey v. Normet subjects the
courts to the rapid extention evidenced by Griffin v. Illinois.
Indigents have greatly benefited by the holdings in Boddie v.
,Connecticut, Frederick v. Schwartz and Lindsey v. Normet. These
decisions of the Supreme Court have increased the capacity of the
legal institutions to provide an alternative to violence as a means
of redress for persons living in poverty.1 6 It is further submitted,
however, that the orderly development of the law and full benefit
of this new interpretation of the law will not be achieved until the
respective roles of due process and equal protection in the matter
of access are made clear. This controversy should be recognized
and resolved in the Supreme Court's review of In re Kras.
18 7
PAUL J. LASKOW
184. 402 U.S. 386 (1971).
185. 52 F.R.D. 389 (D. Conn. 1971); see also text accompanying notes
159-161 supra.
186. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor-
ders at 5-11.
187. 331 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct.
955 (1972).
